Anti-ISIS Operations (Iraq & Syria)

Recent intelligence-led operations have resulted in the elimination of several high-ranking figures within the organization, signaling a sustained and effective campaign against its leadership structure. In March 2025, a significant operation in Iraq, conducted by national intelligence services in conjunction with international coalition forces, led to the death of a prominent leader identified as "Abu Khadija," also known as Abdallah Maki Mosleh al-Rifai. This individual was described as a "deputy caliph" and one of the most dangerous operatives globally. The operation, reportedly an airstrike in Anbar province, western Iraq, was confirmed by the Iraqi Prime Minister, who lauded it as another victory against forces of darkness and terrorism. This event was publicly acknowledged by a former head of state, who emphasized the relentless pursuit of such figures by military personnel in coordination with regional governments.

Further demonstrating this ongoing pressure, in September 2025, Iraq's counter-terrorism service confirmed the death of another senior leader, Omar Abdul Qader Bassam, also known as Abdul Rahman Al-Habi, during a security operation in Syria led by international forces. This individual was reportedly responsible for orchestrating global attacks and operations. These recent successes build upon previous high-profile eliminations, such as the death of the organization's founder and leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in October 2019 in northwestern Syria, and his successor, Abdullah Qardash (also known as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi), in February 2022 in Idlib province. These leadership losses, while significant, have not entirely dismantled the organization, which has historically demonstrated resilience in replacing its commanders.

The strategic impact of these operations is multifaceted. The targeting of key leaders disrupts the organization's command and control, complicates its ability to plan and execute complex attacks, and degrades its overall operational capacity. Such actions also serve to demoralize operatives and potentially sow discord within the ranks. However, the organization's ideology, which does not solely rely on charismatic individual leaders but rather on the concept of a "caliphate," allows it to maintain a coherent message and recruitment capabilities, albeit to a lesser extent than its peak.

Joint operations by international forces and partner militaries continue to be critical in maintaining pressure. From December 2024 to January 2025, multiple strikes were conducted in the Hamrin mountains of Iraq, targeting known locations. These operations aimed to disrupt and degrade the organization's ability to plan and conduct attacks against civilians, as well as allied personnel. During these engagements, operatives actively engaged coalition forces, leading to the deployment of air assets, including F-16s, F-15s, and A-10s, which successfully eliminated operatives within a cave. These operations, while effective, are not without risk, as evidenced by the death of one coalition member and injuries to two others from different nations during this period.

In Syria, partner forces, enabled by international support, conducted an operation near Dayr az-Zawr in early January 2025, resulting in the capture of an attack cell leader. These partnered operations are deemed essential for maintaining pressure and preventing the group from exploiting the rapidly changing security environment in the region. The enduring defeat of the organization is recognized as a global effort requiring sustained commitment from international coalitions, allies, and partners. Despite suffering leadership losses, the organization maintains organizational cohesion in both Iraq and Syria and retains access to significant funds, estimated between $10 million and $20 million, primarily in cash and other liquid assets. Regional networks continue to extort local populations to exert influence. The continuous targeting of leadership, combined with broader counter-terrorism efforts, remains a cornerstone of the strategy to prevent the group's resurgence and diminish its capacity for violence.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with crucial support from the international coalition, have recently concluded one of their most comprehensive counter-terrorism operations in and around Al-Hawl camp, a critical flashpoint for extremist activity in northeastern Syria. This operation, dubbed "Enduring Security," concluded its second and final phase in November 2024, marking a significant effort since the territorial defeat of the organization's self-proclaimed caliphate in 2019. The initial phase involved thousands of SDF personnel conducting extensive combing operations through Al-Hawl city and its surrounding countryside, leading to the capture of 47 individuals associated with the organization. During these operations, multiple weapons caches were discovered and seized, containing substantial quantities of weapons, ammunition, and military logistical supplies.

The second phase saw thousands of SDF troops entering Al-Hawl camp itself. Over several days, hidden weapons were uncovered in tunnels, and an additional 16 operatives were captured, some attempting to escape upon discovery. Further raids led to the capture of ten more operatives and the discovery of the body of a woman kidnapped and killed by the organization's clandestine religious police operating within the camp. The operation also unearthed several more tunnels concealing weapons caches and individuals identified as child soldiers. Seven additional operatives were captured following an SDF raid on a hideout, with these individuals implicated in extorting the camp's population to fund the organization's activities and attempting to smuggle families out of the camp. The seven-day operation concluded without any SDF casualties or major resistance, resulting in the capture of 79 individuals.

The strategic importance of Al-Hawl camp cannot be overstated. It remains a significant concern due to its large population, which includes tens of thousands of individuals, many of whom are family members of operatives, and its potential as a breeding ground for radicalization and future recruitment. Despite ongoing repatriations, the international community has yet to establish a concrete global plan for the future of these individuals, leaving a complex humanitarian and security challenge. The limited international support for a long-term solution means that Al-Hawl continues to be regarded as one of the most dangerous locations globally.

Beyond Al-Hawl, the SDF continues to play a vital role in broader anti-terrorism efforts. In January 2025, enabled by international forces, the SDF conducted an operation near Dayr az-Zawr, Syria, which led to the capture of an attack cell leader. The international coalition affirms its support for the SDF as they continue offensive operations against the organization in the middle Euphrates River valley, aiming to clear remaining territories, secure the Iraq-Syria border, and definitively end the group's presence in eastern Syria. The SDF's focus on the organization is considered critical for achieving its lasting defeat, as the group continues to pose a threat to all nations.

Tactically, the SDF has demonstrated improved capabilities in conducting counter-operations, including unilateral high-risk arrests and "finish" operations, and has received training from coalition advisors on counter-improvised explosive device (IED) tactics. These efforts are crucial for preventing the resurgence of the organization. However, the SDF's role is evolving within a complex Syrian political landscape. In March 2025, the SDF agreed to integrate into Syrian state institutions under the Syrian caretaker government. This agreement followed an offensive by the Syrian transitional government against the SDF in northeastern Syria in January 2026, which led to a 14-point ceasefire agreement. Under this agreement, the SDF is set to be integrated into the Syrian government, and the governorates of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, along with prisoner-of-war camps for operatives and border crossings, are to be handed over to the government. This political development introduces new complexities and potential shifts in the operational landscape for anti-terrorism efforts in Syria.

A significant strategic shift is underway regarding the international coalition's presence and operational mandate in Iraq, with a two-phase transition plan announced in September 2024. This plan outlines a gradual drawdown of coalition operations in Iraq, while emphasizing a continued commitment to supporting the mission against the organization in northeastern Syria and Iraq. Approximately 2,500 coalition troops are currently in Iraq, with about 2,000 personnel in Syria.

The first phase of this transition is scheduled to conclude by September 2025, during which the coalition's military leadership in Iraq will transition to bilateral security partnerships. This involves the withdrawal of coalition forces from certain locations in Iraq, as mutually determined with the Iraqi government. The second phase is projected to continue through at least September 2026, allowing former coalition members to continue supporting counter-operations in Syria from bases in Iraq. This support is contingent on conditions on the ground and ongoing consultations with future political leaders of Iraq and the international partner.

Initially, there was an expectation that international troops in Iraq would gradually relocate from existing posts in Baghdad to the Kurdistan Region, enhancing the strategic influence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as a logistics and operations hub for both Iraq and Syria. However, following the fall of the previous Syrian administration in December 2024 and concerns about potential cross-border activity by the organization, Iraq has expressed a preference for retaining coalition forces at the Ain al-Assad base in Western Iraq to counter threats emanating from the Syrian border. This shift also reflects Iraqi concerns that the new authorities in Syria were previously affiliated with a different extremist group and had engaged in conflict in Iraq.

Despite the transition, the international partner has affirmed that it is not withdrawing from Iraq, but rather moving towards long-term security relationships similar to those maintained with other global partners. The intention is to remain connected in an advise and assist capacity with Iraqi counter-terrorism services, the Joint Operations Command, the Air Force, and the Kurdish Peshmerga, all of whom play crucial roles in counter-missions. The coalition's military mission in Iraq will continue these partnered activities until its conclusion.

A significant challenge to this transition and ongoing operations comes from Iran-aligned armed groups, which have persistently attacked international forces in Iraq and Syria. Since October 2023, these groups have launched numerous attacks, utilizing unmanned aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and rockets. These attacks are part of a broader pressure campaign by Iran to compel international forces to leave Iraq, a campaign that predates recent regional conflicts. In response to these escalations, additional air defense assets, including advanced missile defense systems, have been deployed to the region to bolster the presence of international forces.

The strategic situation underscores that while the organization has suffered territorial defeat, it remains a significant threat in the region and beyond. The coalition recognizes the need for continued vigilance and readiness to respond, as the organization seeks to reestablish itself and expand its influence. The transition aims to build sustainable military partner capacity, with Iraqi Security Forces increasingly conducting independent operations and training, supported by international logistics and funding. In Syria, the coalition continues to advise and conduct partnered patrols with the SDF, focusing on securing critical infrastructure to prevent it from falling back into the hands of the organization. The mission in Syria remains the enduring defeat of the organization.

A notable political development in the regional anti-terrorism landscape occurred in November 2025, when Syria formally joined the international coalition against the organization, becoming its ninetieth member. This marks a significant geopolitical shift for Syria, moving from its previous alignment within certain spheres of influence to a position of strategic partnership with international allies and regional states. This decision followed a historic visit by the Syrian head of state to a major international capital, where he met with a global leader, signaling a renewed commitment to rehabilitating and rebuilding Syria. As part of this rapprochement, the Syrian head of state was removed from a list of specially designated global terrorists, sanctions were paused to encourage investment, and Syria was permitted to reopen its embassy in a key international capital.

This move was welcomed by regional states, who view Syria's participation as crucial in addressing the renewed threat posed by the organization. There is a shared concern that without sustained external support and cooperation, the Syrian state could remain too weak to govern effectively, creating power vacuums and exacerbating economic and humanitarian crises that extremist groups could exploit.

In February 2026, a meeting of political directors from the international coalition against the organization convened in a regional capital. Chaired by a regional deputy foreign minister, the meeting included representatives from 90 member states, with the Syrian interim Foreign Minister and intelligence chief also in attendance. Discussions at this meeting focused primarily on the security situation related to the organization's activity in Syria and Iraq, assessing remaining threats, preventing resurgence through sleeper cells, and strengthening security and military coordination. This meeting was part of broader efforts to confront the organization, with an operations room involving Syria, Iraq, a neighboring country, and two other regional states expected to commence work soon.

Concurrently, in February 2025, an Iraqi security delegation prepared to visit Damascus to discuss critical security issues, including securing the Iraq-Syria border and confronting remnants of the organization. The delegation's agenda also included establishing direct security communication channels for enhanced coordination and addressing the issue of detainees held by partner forces in northern Syria. Iraqi officials emphasized that the visit was purely security-oriented, aimed at addressing urgent security needs, particularly border security and combating the organization, without deeper political alignment with the Syrian administration. Iraq's priority is to address the ongoing threat, especially in specific desert regions, and to prepare for any political transitions in Syria while respecting the will of the Syrian people.

However, the internal dynamics within Syria remain complex. In January 2026, the Syrian transitional government launched an offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria. This conflict led to a 14-point ceasefire agreement in January 2026, negotiated through an international envoy. Under this agreement, the SDF is set to be integrated into the Syrian government, and control over the governorates of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, along with prisoner-of-war camps for operatives and border crossings, will be transferred to the government. This integration represents a significant shift in the internal power structures and could impact the operational effectiveness of anti-terrorism efforts in these areas. The new Syrian administration, led by a figure previously associated with an extremist group, faces challenges in consolidating power and ensuring stability, with the organization exploiting the fragmented security landscape to reestablish its foothold. These political developments highlight the intricate balance between regional diplomacy, internal Syrian dynamics, and the overarching goal of achieving the enduring defeat of the organization.

Despite significant territorial losses and sustained counter-terrorism operations, the organization remains a persistent and adaptable terrorist threat in Iraq and Syria, operating as a decentralized insurgency. As of March 2025, estimates suggest the group retains approximately 3,000 fighters across Iraq and Syria. The organization has demonstrated a continued capacity for planning, organizing, and conducting attacks, exploiting areas of instability and government weakness.

A critical aspect of the organization's resilience is its robust financial infrastructure. Despite efforts to disrupt its funding, the group maintains organizational cohesion and access to substantial funds, estimated to be between $10 million and $20 million, primarily held in cash and other liquid assets. Historically, the organization has been financially self-sustaining, relying minimally on foreign patrons and instead generating most of its revenue locally within Iraq and Syria. Its financial model deviates from traditional terrorist groups, focusing on state-like revenue generation through coercion and co-optation.

Key sources of funding include:
* **Extortion and Taxation:** Regional networks continue to extort local populations as part of their efforts to exert influence in parts of Syria and Iraq. This includes protection rackets targeting commercial, reconstruction, and oil sectors.
* **Smuggling Networks:** Operatives continue to exploit porous borders, particularly between Iraq and Syria, to smuggle goods, individuals, oil, weapons, and narcotics. These smuggling operations can generate significant daily revenues, reportedly over $100,000 per day. The cross-border frontier provides the ecosystem necessary for the group to survive and restore its capabilities, making sanctuary denial on both sides of the border a crucial strategy.
* **Oil Revenue:** At its peak, access to oil fields in Syria and Iraq was arguably the most lucrative source of revenue, with the group capturing and exploiting these resources. While its direct control over major oil infrastructure has diminished, the illicit trade of oil and other natural resources remains a potential income stream.
* **Criminal Activities:** The organization engages in various criminal activities, including robbing banks, selling illegal drugs, looting, and illegally selling stolen artifacts.
* **Donations and Informal Transfers:** While less significant than local revenue generation, the group still receives contributions from sympathizers through informal funds transfer networks, particularly to secure the release of associates from detention facilities in northeastern Syria. Historically, wealthy donors, primarily from Gulf states, contributed to the group, especially during its zenith.

The ability of the organization to maintain these diverse revenue streams allows it to pay fighters, retain influence, and project a threat. The ongoing presence of large numbers of detainees and displaced persons, particularly in camps like Al-Hawl, also presents a significant challenge, as these environments can be exploited for recruitment and radicalization. The issue of border security remains a critical vulnerability, with Iraqi Security Forces having limited capability to fully secure the extensive border with Syria, which remains especially porous. The presence of various armed groups at and around border crossings further complicates control efforts.

The strategic situation indicates that while the territorial caliphate has been dismantled, the underlying conditions that allow the organization to persist—such as fragmented security landscapes, economic hardship, and the continued flow of illicit funds—remain. Countering this persistent threat requires a multi-pronged approach that not only targets leadership and conducts military operations but also focuses on disrupting financial networks, securing borders, addressing humanitarian crises in camps, and fostering long-term stability and governance in affected regions. The organization is "down, but not out," and its potential for resurgence necessitates sustained international and regional efforts.