Somalia (AFRICOM)

Recent intelligence indicates a significant intensification of air operations against militant groups in Somalia, particularly Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, by international forces. As of mid-July 2026, the number of airstrikes conducted this year has reached at least 76, placing the current operational tempo on track to surpass the record of 124 strikes set in 2025. This escalation reflects a sustained and aggressive posture aimed at degrading the capabilities of these groups. Multiple strikes have been reported in July 2026 alone. On July 15, an airstrike targeted Al-Shabaab in the vicinity of Welmaro, approximately 100 km north of Kismayo. This followed earlier operations on July 4 and July 5, which struck Al-Shabaab targets near Jamame (60 km northeast of Kismayo) and Juba (75 km northwest of Kismayo), respectively. Another strike occurred on July 8, approximately 90 km northwest of Kismayo. These operations are consistently conducted in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia and the Somali Armed Forces, with the stated objective of degrading the militants' ability to threaten international forces and citizens abroad. Beyond Al-Shabaab, ISIS-Somalia has also been a target. In April 2026, multiple airstrikes were carried out in the Golis Mountains, between 55km and 90km southeast of Bossaso, specifically targeting ISIS-Somalia elements. These strikes underscore a dual-front counter-terrorism effort against both major extremist organizations operating within the country. The strategic rationale behind this heightened air campaign is to disrupt militant networks, eliminate key operatives, and reduce their freedom of movement and operational capacity. However, the long-term effectiveness of this approach is a subject of ongoing debate. Some analyses suggest that while these strikes inflict tactical losses, they have not fundamentally altered the strategic stalemate with Al-Shabaab, which continues to control significant rural areas and adapt its tactics. There are arguments that the continuous military pressure, particularly without a robust and sustainable ground component from national forces, may inadvertently fuel recruitment by allowing militant groups to frame the conflict as an external intervention. The operational security surrounding these strikes remains high, with specific details about units and assets involved not being released. This lack of transparency extends to casualty estimates and assessments of civilian harm, which have reportedly ceased to be publicly shared by international forces since last year. This raises concerns among some observers regarding accountability and the broader impact of the air war on the civilian population. The increased frequency of strikes also highlights the persistent and evolving threat posed by Al-Shabaab. The group has demonstrated resilience, regaining territory previously lost to government forces in 2025, particularly in central Somalia. They continue to employ a range of tactics, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, shelling, and targeted assassinations, particularly against government officials. Furthermore, intelligence reports indicate Al-Shabaab's intelligence wing has been exploiting clan rivalries and local grievances, effectively embedding itself within clan dynamics to corrode trust and expand influence. The group is also increasingly focusing on urban and trading areas, imposing blockades to strangle communities and interfere with daily life, and becoming more politically astute by seeking alliances. This adaptability underscores the complex and enduring nature of the insurgency, suggesting that air power alone may not be sufficient to achieve decisive victory. The strategic situation is further complicated by the ongoing debate about the overall US counterterrorism policy in Somalia. Some analysts argue that the focus on local insurgencies like Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, which are primarily interested in national objectives rather than global jihad, may be misdirected and that continued military involvement risks deeper entanglement without achieving vital US security interests. The current administration's approach has seen a significant increase in strikes compared to previous administrations, indicating a shift towards a more aggressive, air-centric counterterrorism strategy.

Somalia is currently navigating a profound political crisis stemming from recent constitutional amendments and the subsequent extension of the presidential and parliamentary terms. In March 2026, the Federal Parliament approved a series of constitutional changes, which were then signed into law by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. These amendments notably extended the terms of both the Federal Parliament and the President from four to five years, effectively postponing the next elections until 2027. The President's administration has framed this extension as a necessary step to facilitate technical preparations for future one-person, one-vote elections, moving away from the traditional clan-based electoral system. However, this move has been met with strong condemnation from opposition parties, including the Somali Future Council, who have denounced it as a 'constitutional coup.' Critics argue that the amendments significantly expand executive power, particularly by granting the president authority to appoint the prime minister without requiring parliamentary approval, and that the process lacked inclusive consensus. The political fallout has been immediate and severe. In early June 2026, violent clashes erupted in Mogadishu between government forces and opposition-affiliated militias, resulting in at least 13 fatalities and 189 injuries over two days. These protests were planned in response to the term extension and mirror similar election-related unrest seen in 2021. The violence underscores the fragility of the political landscape and the deep divisions within the country. Adding to the federal-level instability, tensions between the Federal Government and several Federal Member States have escalated. The semi-autonomous state of Puntland, for instance, withdrew its recognition and confidence in the Federal Government in March 2024, following earlier constitutional changes. Puntland has called for a 'mutually accepted Somali constitution' and declared its intention to operate independently until such a framework is established. More recently, in March 2026, the South West State also severed ties with the federal government, alleging an attempted coup against its president by federal forces and reporting clashes between regional and pro-government militias. These regional disputes further fragment the national security architecture and complicate efforts to present a united front against militant groups. The current political impasse threatens to deepen fragmentation and distract from the critical fight against Al-Shabaab. The lack of a clear and broadly accepted electoral roadmap, coupled with the perceived unconstitutionality of the term extension, undermines the legitimacy of the federal government and its ability to govern effectively. International partners, including the US and UK, have attempted to mediate high-level talks between the Federal Government and the Somali Future Council, but these discussions reportedly ended in a stalemate in May 2026 due to persistent disagreements over the electoral model and the presidential mandate. The historical context of political instability, including the country's last democratic multi-party elections in 1969 and subsequent struggles to establish a functioning state, casts a long shadow over current developments. The current crisis highlights a recurring pattern where institutional rules are weakly enforced, and incumbency becomes a primary political resource, often leading to a cycle of principled opposition followed by similar actions once in power. This systemic issue hinders long-term stability and the development of robust democratic institutions. The ongoing political infighting and constitutional disputes also have direct implications for security sector reform and the ability to sustain military operations. A government perceived as illegitimate or unstable struggles to effectively retain, equip, pay, and deploy its security forces, creating vulnerabilities that militant groups can exploit. The upcoming period, leading up to the postponed elections in 2027, will be crucial in determining whether Somalia can overcome this political fragmentation and refocus on its pressing security and development challenges.

The future of international security support in Somalia, particularly the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), is facing significant uncertainty, raising critical questions about Somalia's path to self-reliance in security. AUSSOM, which replaced the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in January 2025, is mandated to support Somali security forces and stabilize areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, with the ultimate goal of transferring full security responsibility to national forces. However, the mission's long-term sustainability is now in doubt due to funding concerns. In July 2026, several African Union member states voiced warnings that AUSSOM cannot continue indefinitely, urging the Federal Government of Somalia to accelerate its efforts to prepare national forces for full security ownership. This call comes amidst reports that a major international partner intends to block United Nations support for AUSSOM beyond 2026. Such a move would have severe operational implications for the nearly 12,000-strong AU mission, which heavily relies on UN logistical support, including provisions for food, water, fuel, medical services, and troop transportation. The potential withdrawal of this critical funding could effectively end AUSSOM's operations, leaving a significant security vacuum. The debate over AUSSOM's funding and future highlights a persistent challenge: ensuring that the security transition does not outpace the capacity of Somali security forces to assume responsibilities without jeopardizing gains against Al-Shabaab. A joint assessment reportedly cautioned that Al-Shabaab retains the capacity for asymmetric attacks and that territorial gains remain vulnerable without sustained stabilization efforts, governance presence, and logistical support. Compounding these external challenges are internal issues within the Somali security sector. While President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud announced in April 2026 that Somalia would conduct all initial military training domestically, strengthening local academies and planning a new Defence University, the country faces significant hurdles in building a truly self-reliant force. The deeper problem lies in the Federal Government's struggle to retain, equip, pay, and effectively deploy trained personnel. Fiscal constraints mean the government remains heavily dependent on donors, leading to a mismatch where troops can be trained but cannot be sustained in the field with regular salaries, ammunition, or logistical support. Political fragmentation and clan dynamics further complicate security sector reform. Tensions between Mogadishu and Federal Member States, such as Puntland and South West State, hinder efforts to create a unified national security architecture. Clan loyalties often compete with national command structures, and regional leaders may prioritize semi-autonomous forces over full integration into the national army. This environment contributes to attrition and desertion among soldiers, who may view deployments through local interests rather than national missions. Despite these challenges, other international partners are stepping up their involvement. Türkiye's parliament recently approved a two-year extension of its military mission in Somalia, reaffirming its commitment to providing training, advisory support, and assistance against terrorism and maritime threats until July 2028. Türkiye operates its largest overseas military training base in Mogadishu and has trained thousands of Somali soldiers. This extended mandate also allows Turkish forces to operate in Somalia's maritime domain, contributing to efforts against piracy and illegal fishing. Furthermore, new regional alignments are emerging. Reports from February 2026 indicate a covert training program for approximately 1,000 Somali recruits in Galmudug, conducted by a detachment from a regional military force. This follows a major defense pact between Egypt and Somalia in August 2024, which included the delivery of artillery and anti-aircraft systems. These developments suggest a diversification of security partnerships for Somalia, potentially aimed at offsetting the uncertainties surrounding traditional AU and UN support. The UN Transition Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) is also scheduled to conclude its operations by October 2026, transferring remaining tasks to national institutions and other UN agencies. This broader UN transition, coupled with the precarious situation of AUSSOM, underscores a critical juncture for Somalia. The ability of the Federal Government to consolidate its security forces, address internal political divisions, and effectively absorb the responsibilities currently borne by international missions will be paramount in determining the country's stability and its capacity to counter the enduring threat of Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab continues to represent the most significant and resilient threat to Somalia's stability, with recent intelligence indicating an evolving operational strategy and a persistent strategic stalemate with government forces. Despite sustained counter-terrorism efforts by international and national forces, the group has demonstrated remarkable adaptability and resilience, regaining territory and intensifying its campaign of violence. In 2025, Al-Shabaab made significant territorial gains, effectively reversing many of the advances made by the government in 2022-2023. While the government, with external backing, has managed to push back in some areas, particularly around Mogadishu, large swathes of central Somalia remain under the militants' control. This has led to a protracted impasse where neither side has been able to achieve a decisive advantage, characterizing the conflict as a 'forever war.' The group's tactics have become more sophisticated and diversified. Al-Shabaab's intelligence wing, known as the Amniyat, has been particularly effective in exploiting existing clan rivalries and local grievances. By embedding themselves within clan dynamics and offering themselves as political and economic tools, they erode trust in the central government and expand their influence from within. This approach allows them to gain local support or at least acquiescence, making it harder for government forces to operate. Al-Shabaab has also increased the tempo of targeted assassinations against government officials and conducted bombings, such as one on a Somali National Army recruitment center. These actions are designed to raise the costs of cooperation with the Federal Government and deter resistance to the group. Attacks on critical infrastructure, including the international airport, have also surged, demonstrating their capability to strike at symbols of government authority and international presence. Economically, Al-Shabaab is described as al-Qaeda's largest, wealthiest, and deadliest affiliate, generating over $150 million in annual revenue within Somalia alone. They govern a significant portion of the country's district capitals through a functioning shadow state, which allows them to impose taxes, administer justice, and provide some services, further entrenching their presence and control over the population. A notable shift in Al-Shabaab's playbook includes efforts to improve relations with the population in areas they control, mitigating their reliance on coercion. This suggests a more strategic approach to governance and public relations, aiming to secure popular legitimacy alongside military control. They are also increasingly focusing on urban and trading areas, employing blockades to disrupt economic activity and pressure communities. Furthermore, the group is becoming more politically astute, actively seeking alliances to further its objectives. The strategic situation is further complicated by the ongoing political instability within the Federal Government of Somalia, including the recent constitutional crisis and federal-state tensions. This internal fragmentation diverts resources and attention from the counter-insurgency effort and weakens the government's ability to present a unified and effective response. The challenges in building a self-reliant Somali National Army, particularly in terms of retention, equipment, and consistent payment, also create vulnerabilities that Al-Shabaab readily exploits. Despite the significant number of international airstrikes and the presence of international security missions like AUSSOM, the conflict remains an impasse. The group's ability to adapt, exploit local dynamics, and maintain a shadow governance structure means that a purely military solution is unlikely to be effective. A comprehensive strategy would need to integrate military pressure with robust governance, justice, and economic reforms, alongside efforts to alleviate civilian suffering in militant-controlled areas and explore potential avenues for dialogue. The current trajectory suggests that Al-Shabaab will continue to be a formidable and enduring challenge for Somalia and its international partners for the foreseeable future.