Somalia (AFRICOM)

Recent weeks have seen a continuation of robust counter-terrorism operations in Somalia, primarily led by US forces in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Somali Armed Forces (SAF). These operations are strategically aimed at degrading the capabilities of Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, which continue to pose significant threats to regional stability and international security. Multiple airstrikes have been conducted, demonstrating an ongoing commitment to disrupting militant networks and protecting both US personnel and citizens abroad. For instance, an airstrike targeting Al-Shabaab occurred on August 7, 2026, in the vicinity of Jilib, approximately 322 km southwest of Mogadishu. This followed similar actions on July 30, 2026, and June 23, 2026, against Al-Shabaab targets. Further strikes against Al-Shabaab were reported on July 15, 2026, near Welmaro, approximately 100 km north of Kismayo, and on July 13, 2026, in the vicinity of Qumbi, approximately 88 km northwest of Kismayo. Another strike on July 8, 2026, occurred approximately 90km northwest of Kismayo. These consistent engagements underscore the persistent threat posed by Al-Shabaab, which has demonstrated resilience and adaptability in its operational tactics. Beyond direct kinetic actions, a notable shift in the US military posture has emerged with a new security agreement signed in early August 2026. The top US special operations commander for Africa entered into an agreement with the president of Puntland, a semi-autonomous region in northeastern Somalia, to expand an American military installation in Bosaso. This development, announced through a statement from the Puntland government, aims to enhance operations against terrorism and bolster maritime security in the region. The expansion of the Bosaso base is particularly significant given its strategic location on the Gulf of Aden, a critical maritime trade route. This move signals a potential re-evaluation of engagement strategies in the Horn of Africa, with some observers suggesting it reflects a growing willingness to operate within Somalia's fragmented political landscape rather than solely through the central government. The agreement reportedly bypassed the FGS, raising questions about the country's already strained federal system and the sovereignty of the central government. Historically, the US has maintained a dual-track approach, supporting the FGS while also building direct relationships with regional authorities. This latest agreement, however, appears to deepen direct engagement with a federal member state that does not fully recognize the authority of Mogadishu, potentially exacerbating internal political tensions. The strategic implications of these developments are multifaceted. The continued airstrikes aim to degrade Al-Shabaab's ability to plan and execute attacks, thereby reducing its capacity to threaten US interests and regional stability. The expansion of the Bosaso base, while framed as a counter-terrorism and maritime security initiative, also positions US forces to better address broader regional security challenges, including those in the Red Sea. The increased US military presence and direct engagement with Puntland could be interpreted as a pragmatic response to the FGS's perceived limitations in effectively combating terrorism and asserting control across the entire country. However, it also risks further alienating the FGS and complicating efforts to foster national unity and a cohesive security architecture. The informal nature of the agreement, lacking public text and official confirmation from AFRICOM or Washington, adds to the complexity and raises concerns about transparency and adherence to international norms regarding state sovereignty. The overall strategic situation reflects a dynamic environment where counter-terrorism efforts are intertwined with complex internal political dynamics and evolving international partnerships. The US has significantly increased its airstrikes in Somalia, with a record 124 strikes last year and an additional 78 so far in 2026, indicating a sustained and intensified campaign against militant groups.

Somalia is currently grappling with a profound political impasse, intensified by external pressure and internal fragmentation, which significantly impacts its security landscape. International partners have expressed growing concern over the prolonged political deadlock, reportedly warning the federal government to achieve a comprehensive political agreement by the end of August 2026. This warning underscores fears that continued political infighting could undermine critical state-building efforts, institutional reforms, and the overall security agenda. Key contentious issues include constitutional amendments, the electoral process, and the delicate balance of power between the federal government and federal member states. The disputes have stalled consensus on an electoral framework and the reform of government institutions, despite repeated calls from international actors for dialogue and an inclusive political agreement as essential for stability and continued international support. The potential for re-evaluation of development support, project financing, and political cooperation looms if a resolution is not found, with even the level of diplomatic relations being subject to review. Adding to this political fragility are recent clashes between federal government-aligned forces and regional forces, particularly in Puntland. In early August 2026, armed forces from Puntland attacked a camp held by federal government troops near Galkayo. Puntland's president stated that this was a 'planned security operation' to send a clear message against those undermining the region's security and stability. He claimed the camp was being used by the federal government to transport weapons, military equipment, and troops in an attempt to destabilize Puntland. This incident highlights the deep-seated mistrust and power struggles between Mogadishu and some federal member states, further complicating efforts to establish a unified national security architecture. The camp was reportedly occupied by troops who had previously aligned with Puntland but whose commanders recently pledged allegiance to the federal government, indicating shifting loyalties and internal divisions within security forces. Such internal conflicts divert resources and attention from the primary fight against Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, creating vulnerabilities that militant groups can exploit. The broader political context includes ongoing efforts by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to implement political reforms aimed at strengthening state institutions and transitioning to a party-based political system. In July 2026, the President spoke of these reforms as the most significant political restructuring since the establishment of the federal system, moving Somalia from a fragmented political order towards a more structured system. However, progress on the electoral roadmap ahead of elections expected in 2026 has triggered tensions, with deadlocks persisting over the electoral model. Federal officials and opposition politicians have pushed back on plans for universal suffrage and reducing the number of political parties, despite parliament passing a law in November 2024 to allow one-person-one-vote to replace the clan-based indirect voting system. These political divisions are not merely theoretical; they have manifested in bloody clashes in Mogadishu in June 2026 between government forces and armed opposition factions, though these were quickly contained. The ouster of the Southwest State leader in March 2026 also raised fears of similar federal government interventions in other states like Puntland. The current political environment is characterized by a struggle for legitimacy and control, with the federal government often relying on clan militia to lead operations against Al-Shabaab, further blurring lines of authority and potentially exacerbating clan-based conflicts. This complex interplay of political maneuvering, regional autonomy aspirations, and internal security force divisions creates a challenging environment for effective governance and sustained counter-terrorism efforts.

Somalia is currently facing a severe and rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by prolonged drought, widespread displacement, and drastic cuts in international funding. Approximately 6 million people, or about one-third of the population, are estimated to be experiencing food shortages. Nearly 1.9 million individuals are at emergency levels of food insecurity, requiring urgent assistance. The first three months of 2026 alone saw almost 512,000 people displaced within Somalia, with drought being the primary driver for nine out of ten displacements. Alarmingly, 85 percent of those displaced are women and children, who are also disproportionately affected by malnutrition. A recent survey in Baidoa, a major hub for displaced populations, revealed that half of the children screened in displacement sites are acutely malnourished, with one in four severely malnourished. Since the beginning of the year, over 21,000 children have been admitted to outpatient malnutrition facilities in Baidoa, double the number from the same period last year. Despite the escalating needs, the humanitarian response in Somalia is critically underfunded. The country's Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for 2026 was reduced to $852 million, targeting only 2.4 million people, less than half of those in need. By July, the plan was less than one-third funded. International support to Somalia has plummeted by 88 percent compared to 2022, with traditional donors, including the US and the UK, deprioritizing the country. This funding shortfall is severely weakening already fragile health services, forcing the health system to absorb a crisis far beyond its capacity. The lack of resources is hindering efforts to prevent avoidable deaths and address the widespread malnutrition and health crisis, particularly in southwestern Somalia. The situation is further compounded by the projection of a greater than 90% probability of El Niño conditions developing from mid-2026 and intensifying during Somalia's October-to-December rainy season, bringing a severe risk of flooding that could further exacerbate the crisis. Concurrently, Al-Shabaab continues to pose a persistent and evolving threat, demonstrating sophisticated capabilities in revenue generation and expanding its regional and international connections. The group's annual revenues are estimated to be up to $200 million, derived from a complex web of organized criminal activities. These include direct extortion, illicit taxation across nearly all sectors of Somalia's economy (including levies at ports, on roadways, and on trade), illicit trade, smuggling, trafficking, and money laundering. Mogadishu and southern Somalia remain the group's largest tax base, and Al-Shabaab even generates revenue by investing in urban real estate through intermediaries. This financial prowess allows Al-Shabaab to sustain its operations and adapt its tactics. Strategically, Al-Shabaab's ties to Al-Qaeda and its growing engagements with the Houthi paramilitary group in Yemen are of significant concern. Houthi delegations have reportedly traveled to Somalia to provide training to Al-Shabaab (and ISIS-Somalia) in explosives, maritime interdiction, and drone usage. The Houthis have also facilitated the transfer of arms, ammunition, explosives, and both weaponized and surveillance drones into Somalia, relying on illicit maritime networks operating in a triangular Yemen-Somalia-Iran trade route. These connections enhance Al-Shabaab's operational capabilities and extend its regional reach, posing a threat to vital maritime trade routes through the Red Sea. A recent UN Security Council report also indicated the transfer of several Al-Shabaab fighters from Somalia to Afghanistan, highlighting the group's transnational links and the potential for broader global terrorist operations. While measures by the Somali government have restricted the movement of foreign fighters seeking to join ISIS in Somalia, the process has not been completely halted. The group's ability to exploit porous borders, persistent state fragility, armed conflict, and corruption further enables its expanding revenue generation and operational capacity, making it a formidable and adaptable adversary.

The geopolitical landscape surrounding Somalia is undergoing significant shifts, marked by new regional defense pacts and an uncertain future for international security missions. A notable development on August 7, 2026, was the signing of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. This pact stipulates that an armed attack against any one of these three nations would be considered an attack against all. While Somalia maintains extensive bilateral military and security arrangements with all three signatories, it is not a party to this collective-defense agreement. This places Somalia within their strategic orbit but without the formal treaty protection or a seat at the decision-making table, creating a structural gap that is likely to become more consequential as regional competition intensifies. Turkey, in particular, has a deep and growing involvement in Somalia. It operates its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, which has trained over 15,000 Somali troops. The Turkish navy patrols Somali territorial waters under a mandate extended through July 2028. Turkey also manages Somalia's port and airport under 30-year concessions and is engaged in offshore oil drilling, with terms that could grant Ankara up to 90% of early revenues. In August 2026, a complete brigade of Somalia's Gorgor commando units concluded advanced training in Turkey, marking a new milestone in their military cooperation aimed at boosting the Somali army's operational capacity against Al-Shabaab. Saudi Arabia signed a military cooperation agreement with Somalia in February 2026, followed by additional agreements on maritime transport and port development. Pakistan also signed a defense cooperation memorandum with Somalia in August 2026, covering counter-terrorism, military qualification programs, and expertise exchanges. These bilateral agreements position Somalia firmly within the strategic orbit of the Mecca Agreement signatories, strengthening the Mogadishu-aligned bloc relative to competing regional interests. Simultaneously, the future of the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM), which replaced ATMIS on January 1, 2025, is increasingly precarious. The mission, comprising troops from Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, is crucial for supporting Somali forces against Al-Shabaab. However, its long-term viability is threatened by severe funding shortfalls and unresolved financing disputes at the UN Security Council. A critical development occurred on July 1, 2026, when the US Mission to the African Union notified the AU Commission that it would not support extending the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond AUSSOM's current mandate expiry on December 31, 2026. While the US would not object to AUSSOM's mandate renewal, it would refuse to back any UN Security Council resolution preserving UNSOS or authorizing UN logistical and operational support. This decision effectively means that AUSSOM, even if its mandate is renewed, would lack the essential logistical architecture—including provisions for troops, fuel, and mobility—required to implement its mission. A summit convened in Kampala on July 31, 2026, specifically to address this gap, reportedly concluded without securing financing, a political deal with Somalia, or a contingency plan, leaving AUSSOM's fate largely to individual troop-contributing countries. This situation creates a significant vacuum in Somalia's security architecture, potentially undermining gains made against Al-Shabaab and increasing the burden on the nascent Somali National Army. The Somali President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, recently visited Galmudug to oversee military training and launch development projects, signaling ongoing efforts to strengthen the armed forces. This comes as Somalia faces a structural impasse in its conflict with Al-Shabaab, where neither side can achieve a decisive victory. The withdrawal of critical international logistical support for AUSSOM could severely hamper the FGS's ability to conduct large-scale operations and maintain territorial control, especially as Al-Shabaab continues to exploit governance gaps and clan divisions. The evolving geopolitical alignments, with Somalia navigating complex relationships with various international partners, will play a crucial role in shaping its future security and stability. The lack of formal inclusion in the Mecca Agreement, despite strong bilateral ties, highlights Somalia's delicate position in a region increasingly influenced by competing external interests and security agendas.